<\/p>\n
Though no group has claimed responsibility, security officials and experts believe that the Islamic State’s local affiliates are behind the latest attack in Mastung.<\/p>\n
Last week, tragedy struck at the heart of Balochistan\u2019s Mastung district, casting a somber shadow over its dusty streets. On the fateful Friday, a suicide bomber targeted a gathering preparing for the 12th Rabiul Awwal procession, commemorating the birth anniversary of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). The blast echoed through the main market, claiming the lives of at least 55 people<\/a> and leaving over 120 injured.<\/p>\n \u201cNo one expected them to attack the 12th Rabiul Awwal procession,\u201d said Muhammad Ashgar, a member of the procession\u2019s organising committee. He added that the district administration and police had warned them about threats from militant groups, urging them to cancel or scale down the procession. \u201cWe perceived it as an attempt to intimidate us,\u201d Asghar told Dawn.com<\/em>.<\/p>\n \u201cIn Balochistan, militant groups have historically targeted the Shia community and their Muharram processions. However, they hadn\u2019t targeted the 12th Rabiul Awwal procession,\u201d he explained. \u201cThis attack indicates a shift, with the Barelvi community now being targeted along similar lines.\u201d<\/p>\n Though no specific group has claimed responsibility, security officials and experts believe that the militant Islamic State\u2019s (IS) local affiliates are behind the attack.<\/p>\n This belief stems from the fact that Mastung district has recently witnessed a spate of terror incidents linked to the militant IS\u2019s two local affiliates \u2014 the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) and the Islamic State in Pakistan Province (ISPP).<\/p>\n Officials have also noted a change in tactics by the IS-linked groups in Mastung. \u201cInstead of initiating attacks after long intervals, the gap between their attacks is diminishing,\u201d an intelligence official based in Quetta, told Dawn.com<\/em>.<\/p>\n On September 14, IS claimed responsibility for a bomb attack targeting a convoy of the Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam-Fazl (JUI-F),<\/a> an Islamist political party, in the Joto area of Mastung district. The attack injured 11 people, including the party\u2019s former senator, Hafiz Hamdullah.<\/p>\n The group also claimed responsibility for the killing of a Levies official<\/a> and injuring another in Bus Adda locality on September 7, days after an attack targeting a policeman near Wali Khan police station on August 26. In another incident on August 12, the terror outfit claimed to have killed a policeman in the Kanak area, signalling a concerning escalation in their violent activities.<\/p>\n In early 2015, the IS\u2019s central leadership established a chapter for Afghanistan and Pakistan,<\/a> known as the Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISKP). Unlike Afghanistan, however, ISKP\u2019s network in Pakistan primarily comprises two categories of militants.<\/p>\n The first group consists of former Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants, some of whom are Salafi or hold anti-Shia sectarian tendencies. These mainly hail from various parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, including Bajaur, Orakzai, Kohat, and South Waziristan. The second group comprises militants from the banned militant outfit Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LeJ), an anti-Shia militant group, predominantly from Balochistan\u2019s Mastung, Quetta, Nushki and Khuzdar regions, as well as parts of northern Sindh.<\/p>\n In a strategic move to focus ISKP solely on Afghanistan and draw in Pakistani militant outfits, especially those linked with the TTP, LeJ, and other Pakistani Jihadi groups focusing on India-administered Kashmir, the IS leadership formally introduced the Islamic State Province of Pakistan (ISPP) in May 2019. This marked a distinct administrative separation of Pakistan from ISKP. In 2021, however, almost the entire KP province, previously under the ISPP\u2019s jurisdiction, was integrated into ISKP\u2019s organisational network following directives from IS Central.<\/p>\n During the 1990s, as the Punjab police intensified their crackdown on sectarian groups, numerous LeJ militants sought refuge in hideouts provided by local religious leaders and seminaries affiliated with the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) in Balochistan\u2019s various regions, primarily in areas such as Mastung, Quetta, and Nushki.<\/p>\n Interviews with religious leaders and journalists in Mastung suggest that LeJ militants from Punjab established the terror group\u2019s organisational structure in Balochistan\u2019s Baloch-populated districts such as Mastung, Quetta, Nushki, and Kalat. Using the terror outfit\u2019s anti-Shia and anti-Iran rhetoric, they motivated local militants to target the Hazara Shia community in Quetta and during their travels to Iran for pilgrimage, particularly on the main highway in Mastung.<\/p>\n Tariq Parvez, who led the crackdown against sectarian outfits in Punjab in the 1990s as the head of the Crime Intelligence Department (CID), acknowledged that numerous LeJ militants fleeing the crackdown found refuge in Balochistan, Karachi, and other parts of the country.<\/p>\n \u201cQuetta and neighbouring districts served as ideal locations for LeJ and other jihadist groups, offering hiding spots in madrassas run by ideological partners and facilitating movement to Afghanistan,\u201d Parvez, who also served as the head of the National Counter-Terrorism Authority (NACTA), told Dawn.com<\/em>.<\/p>\n He noted that after the weakening of sectarian terrorism in Punjab, Balochistan began witnessing sectarian violence in 2002, manifested through attacks on the Hazara community in and around Quetta.<\/p>\n \u201cThe LeJ\u2019s first major attack on Hazaras in Quetta was in July 2003<\/a> when three gunmen entered an Imambargah during Friday prayers, killing 53 people and injuring 57 others,\u201d he recalled.<\/p>\n Until mid-2015, LeJ Balochistan operated as a freelance organisation collaborating with several national and transnational militant groups, including the TTP, al-Qaeda, the then newly-formed IS, and the two Iranian Sunni militant groups \u2014 Jundullah, and Jaishul Adl \u2014 according to law enforcement officials and experts in Quetta. Usman Saifullah Kurd served as the LeJ\u2019s operational chief in Balochistan since at least 2002.<\/p>\n Mufti Hidayatullah, a religious leader associated with the SSP, was a founding member of the LeJ in Mastung. His madrassa in Mastung\u2019s Kali Kandawa area served as a hideout for LeJ militants after attacking the Hazara Shia community in Mastung and Quetta.<\/p>\n After Quetta, Mastung saw a rise in attacks on members of the Hazara community. In September 2011, gunmen stopped a bus at Lakpas near Mastung, ordered passengers to disembark, and proceeded to shoot them, killing 26 and wounding six after confirming their identity as Shias.<\/a> In the following years, buses of the Hazara Shia community en route to Iran to visit holy sites were targeted through suicide attacks, claiming hundreds of lives.<\/p>\n IS in Pakistan<\/h2>\n
LeJ \u2014 from Punjab to Balochistan<\/h2>\n
From LeJ to IS<\/h2>\n